

REMARKS 2

ON

LETTERS

CONCERNING

MIN D.



L O N D O N:

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P R E F A C E.

THESE Papers, which are called REMARKS, are taken from the Original Characters of the Author of the LETTERS concerning MIND; and referred to *Passages* in those Letters, in order to *illustrate* or *explain* them.


Tho' the Letters, and these Papers, were written for private Use, yet it is presumed they may be serviceable to Mankind; and, at the same time, preserve the Sentiments and Memory of a worthy and good Man.

Very early in Life he attained to great Perfection in Mathematical Learning; and afterwards applied himself to the Study of the Antients.
With


With what Success may be seen, not only from his explaining and throwing Light upon some of the most difficult and noblest Passages in *Plato* and *Aristotle*, but also from his discovering, amongst the remaining Ruins of the *Pythagorean* Philosophy, the Principles of *Mind* or *Intelligence*.

And he did not rest solely on the bare Authority of the Antients : For he had learned (to use his own Expression) *to go without their Leading-strings*, and had made the Theory of the Understanding complete : And having a full Comprehension of the Principles of *Mind*, was himself enabled to lead others into the same. Nor was he less remarkable for his Modesty, Sedateness, and Honesty (in its *true* Meaning, as explained by himself) than he was for Strength of Mind, and a disinterested Love and Pursuit of *Truth*.

R E M A R K S



REMARKS *on* LETTERS
CONCERNING
M I N D.

 AGE I. RIGHT THOUGHTS
OF THINGS.] ——— The
first and chief Care must
be of the Mind, to keep it
in full Vigour, and in a Disposition
to see things as they ARE, without the
least Wish or Desire that they should
be otherwise than they *are*, whether
they be the things that PROPERLY ARE,
and CANNOT BE OTHERWISE, the OB-
JECTS OF SCIENCE, or the things that
B *improperly*

improperly are, and may be otherwise, the Objects of Opinion.

This implies a Care or due Regimen of the Body, that it may in the best manner accord with the Exercise of the Mind. For as there is a close Union and Sympathy of the Body with the Mind, so on the regular Motions of the former the Energies of the latter in a great measure depend. When therefore the Habit of Body suits with the Exercise of the Mind, then is the Time for the Mind to gratify and to exert itself.

'Tis very evident, that the Work of the Mind ought not to be undertaken as a Task, whether this Work be in *observing, recollecting, reasoning, contemplating, deliberating, or governing and directing* the Conduct of Life. Toward *all this*, as well as towards *outward things*, there ought to be no *impatient*, but a *moderated Desire*: On the other hand, there must be no Languor, no Melancholy, no Envy-
ing;

ing; for TRUTH is GOOD. The Mind must be *passive*, as it were, always open to receive the Light beaming into it: And if it fails of Success, there must be no *Disturbance* about it: The Attempt may be renew'd with the same *easy Disposition*, and *Good-humour*, People commonly take with them to a *Play*, or an *Opera*, which they go to for Amusement or Entertainment.

The Foundation of all *present Happiness* is laid in settling this Matter; and with *this* Disposition of Mind is necessarily connected *Original Enjoyment*, or that *unmix'd Pleasure* to which *Plato* joins the purest Light of the Understanding, the Philosophical Arithmetic.

This same Disposition is coincident with *Natural Affection* and *Equanimity*; but inconsistent with Grief or Sorrow for what may be-tide Children, Relations, Friends, or Country. Learn then to swim in the Stream of PROVIDENCE.

—*Nēu fluites dubiæ spe pendulus
horæ.*

ALL must be resolved into the *Order of Things*, with the highest Veneration for it, every particular Subject improving or contributing to this Order ; but above all the ORDER of NATURE, VIRTUE ITSELF, the Business of Man in this Universe, as mortal, uncertain of the Term of Life, and living in the midst, as it were, of an infinite Succession of Generations past and to come.

How little a thing Life is! Methinks in this last View of things, one has quite lost Sight of the World about us. This is good to aim at every Day of Life —— looking up every Morning to the Higher World.

Page 2. KNOWLEDGE of MEN.] —
The Method of proceeding in the
Knowledge of Mankind is to begin
lege

with *yourself* : And from the Knowledge of *yourself*, to consider that which you have in common with *other Men*; and by what *Addition* and *Subtraction* of Ideas their different Characters are form'd : And to consider how all the Variety of Characters amongst Men in their several Ranks, Stations, and Employments of Life, are deriv'd from a few *Original Principles* of UNDERSTANDING and AFFECTION, in various Degrees and Proportions, by Nature herself mix'd and compounded, must, I should think, be a very agreeable Speculation, if you add the respective *Employments* of each Character in its particular Circumstances, and the *Nature* of the *Government* or *State*, on which the *Manners* of the whole People depend, and observe, at the same time, that, as *Civil Liberty* depends upon *Moral Virtue*, or coincides with it, so it is the Foundation of *all Virtue*,

and all *Arts* and *Sciences*, amongst Men.

And thus it appears, by the way, that a *State* improves in the same manner as a *particular Person*: As *Moral Liberty* is the Foundation of all Improvement in a *private Person*, so *Civil Liberty* is the Foundation of all Improvements in a *State*.

Page 5. GOOD WRITING. ———
How is this Art of *Writing* acquired? Just as *all other Arts* are. From *many* Observations of *One Particular* will result a *General Idea*, which will be a *Rule*; and from *many* Observations of *another Particular* will result *another General Idea*, which will be *another Rule*; and by this Method of proceeding with every Particular that deserves Notice within the Compass of the Art, the *whole Art* will be discover'd.

The

The next Question will be, how I shall *discover* these Particulars, on which I am to fix my Observation, so as to be able to *number* them up, and know when I have them *all*? Now this is already done to our Hands: He, who of all Men seems to have been most capable of doing it, has done it; I mean *Aristotle*. For, besides the great and acknowledged Authority of the Man, I have some particular Reasons of my own for taking *him* to be our Master above all others: Not that I am for passing by a *Tully* or *Quintilian*; on the contrary, such Authors, I am of Opinion, may be of great Help in many Cases. All that I have to say against them is, that I would by no means study them as *Authors*; but rather, by the Help of good *Indexes*, collect out of them such *Definitions*, *Precepts*, *Remarks*, or *general Observations*, as I should think I had Occasion for: Not allowing myself,

in the mean time, to understand them, till I had made the Meaning of *their* Words *my own*, by particular Observation, and Experience too, if necessary.

'Tis from a Sense of this, I suppose, that the good Archbishop of *Cambray* says somewhere, or says to this Purpose, “ That the *Comparing* “ *good and bad Authors* together, “ will bring more *Light* into the “ *Mind*, than any *Reading* or *Study* “ of the Works of *Critics* or *Rhetoricians*.”

It seems, methinks, very plain and evident, that the general Stupidity and Blindness of the Moderns, as to the Art of *Writing*, as well as to the Art of Living, is owing to an unexamined *Opinion*, that the *Sense* and *Skill* of the Authors who wrote of these Arts, will naturally be transfused into them, by the bare *Perusal* of them; especially, if they join a
little

little *profound Thought* and *deep Reflection* on these Subjects.

It may be said, that the Variety of *Styles* is *infinite*. Let *Style* be *infinite*, as *Plato* considers *Pleasure* in the *Philebus*: Let the chief and distinguishing Dignity and Excellence of *Style* consist in *Tropes* and *Figures*, according to the modern Taste: Then, so far as this is the distinguishing Characteristic of *Styles*, all the infinite Variety of them will fall within that which has *fewest*, and that which has *most Tropes* and *Figures* in it. And accordingly, without farther Speculation, I take my Authors in Hand, *good* and *bad*; comparing such as are most cramm'd with *Metaphors* and *Figures*, with such as are of the *lower Strain*, and come near to the *contrary Extreme*; and then proceeding with the *intermediate* ones. Each Author with *himself* I likewise compare, as well as with *one another*.

As

As this Way of gaining a *Taste* or *Judgment* is *easy* and *natural*, so it is *agreeable* and *pleasant*. There is no need of *many Authors*; *fewest* are *best*: Only they must be of *every sort*, *good* and *bad*.

A Man, perhaps, who adheres closely to *Reason*, and fears the taking a Step without that Guide, may object to what has been said above, in the following manner: ‘ If I cannot
 ‘ acquire a *Style*, without being a
 ‘ *Judge* of one, must I use no Endeavour to *acquire* one, till I am
 ‘ a *Judge*; and so restrain myself
 ‘ from *all Exercise*, whether in *speaking*
 ‘ *or writing*? The *Habit*, without
 ‘ *Exercise*, most certainly will
 ‘ never come. — In what manner
 ‘ then must be *this Exercise*? If it
 ‘ be in *speaking*, it will be impossible
 ‘ for me, when the Performance is
 ‘ over, to exercise my Judgment
 ‘ upon it to any Purpose. I shall
 ‘ not be able to *recollect* it, or bring
 ‘ it

‘ it back in View, so as to be able
 ‘ to examine it thoroughly in the
 ‘ *Whole, and all its Parts.*’

The Exercise therefore must be in *Writing*; and upon this *Tully* lays the main Stress. And indeed it is hard to conceive how there ever could have been any such thing as *Eloquence*, if there had been no such thing as *Writing*; --- at least *such* Eloquence as there is now in the World.

‘ But how can *I*, that am *no*
 ‘ *Judge*, pretend to *guide* myself in
 ‘ this Exercise, or *judge* of it after-
 ‘ wards?’

All that can be said is, I must judge as well as I *can*, according to the utmost of my *present Capacity*; and this I may do without determining absolutely what is *right* or *wrong*. I must keep my Mind open to receive *further Light*, which I am endeavouring to bring into it, by studying to *improve* my *Taste* and
Judgment

Judgment in the manner above-mentioned.

Great Care must be taken not to suffer that to pass with me for *right* and *excellent*, which *much pleases* and *delights* me, or which raises the *Admiration* and *Esteem* of others, to whom I communicate it ; which is the *modern Standard*. But, in exercising my Judgment on what I write, I must *suspend my first Assent*, till I have found out the *Standard of Truth* and *Nature* ; and not rest satisfied, till I am conscious *my own Judgment* would agree with that of *Plato* (for instance), *Xenophon*, or *Aristotle*, &c. were my Productions to be laid before them.

For, supposing the *Reality* of a *Standard* to be Matter of Dispute, we all call it that which the *best Judges* agree in ; and not take that for a mere Chimera, in which so many Men of different Ages, Genius, Education, agree, and in which *all*
Men

Men very probably would agree, were they all *duly to cherish* those *Seeds of Judgment* which are in *every Man's Breast*, and cultivate their Minds so far as is requisite in this Case.

Page 5. GOOD BREEDING. — As to forming our *Character*, according to the Standard of what is *Beautiful* or *Handsome*, the right Way, methinks, if we would avoid Affectation, Formality, and an assuming Air, is, to have *no Form* or *beautiful Appearance* in View: Nor are we to consider how to appear in the Eyes of *others*; but to have our Eye upon that which does *not* appear, but *produces* the Appearance.

The Question then is, *What is the Cause that produces the Appearance?* And this I take to be *the Use of Reason* in governing ourselves.

The

The Understanding must have Ideas of what is *little, mean, vile*, or in general *odious* in Company; and apply its Aversion to the particular Ideas, which are as the *Species* to its *general Idea*. It must have its Inclination to *say* and *do* what is *friendly* and *social*, as well with regard to Persons present, as those that are absent: For a Defect in this Case will certainly be odious and deformed. But Friendship or Good-nature can never be offensive. Nor is it Impudence, or Assuming, or Pride, or Arrogance, to refrain from talking or doing things that are little, contemptible, and mean.

This a Man may do, without taking Airs. He may be as *humble* as he pleases, and do this.

What Subjects then of Discourse are little, contemptible, and mean? They are enumerated by *Epicletus*, where he bids you *fix yourself a certain Character, which you are to maintain*

maintain by yourself, and in Company with other Men. You are not (he says) to talk of Meats, Drinks, Sports, &c. nor of Men, comparing them with one another, or censuring them: Nor of yourself, so as to say any thing to set yourself off: For avoiding this is the best Way of setting yourself off, and recommending yourself to the World.

And here, if we will take the Advice of *Menander*, as we have it from *Terence*, we must proceed by the *Negative* in the Way mention'd above: For such at the bottom are the Rules by which the Character of the young Gentleman in the *Andria* is form'd, which made him so much belov'd and esteem'd.

*Sic vita erat: facile omneis perferre
ac pati,
Cum quibus erat cunque una, iis
se se dedere,*

Eorum

*Eorum obsequi studiis, adversus
nemini,
Nunquam præponens se aliis. —*

Then follows a Remark upon these Rules, that observing them is the best Means of winning the Affections of Mankind.

The Word *Studium* is just before explain'd by *Terence* himself, and is used by *Horace* in the same Sense, as will appear below. Indeed the Precepts, that of *se se dedere*, and that other of *obsequi studiis*, seem to be affirmative: But then they are founded in others, and imply others, that are *negative*, and cannot, without Pain, Constraint, and Affectation, take Place, where those others are not in full Force.

Never can the Affection of *Benevolence* operate naturally and freely till *Self-love* is annihilated or subdued. Nor is *se se dedere* an *affirmative* Rule: It implies as well *avoid-*
ing

ing what is *disagreeable*, as *doing* or *saying* what is *agreeable* upon the whole. Nor without Self-denial can that of *obsequi studiis* be put in Practice: Nor had it ever been mention'd, but for the Difficulty of Self-denial.

*Nec tua laudabis studia, aut aliena
reprendes :*

*Nec, cum venari volet ille, poemata
panges.*

*Gratia sic fratrum geminorum,
Amphionis atque*

*Zethi, dissiluit, donec suspecta se-
vero*

Conticuit lyra.

HOR. L. I. Ep. 18.

Self-denial indeed seems to be at the bottom of all. For what is *se se dedere*, but to resign one's self up to others, to forget ourselves, and only to have a Regard to others, and

C

make

make this very thing itself the Object of *Self-love* ?

Every Motion of the Mind (says *Tully*) has its outward visible Effect: And as the common Way of endeavouring to please, and to make a fine Appearance, has its *outward* Appearance, tho' but a very poor one; so, on the other hand, that which flows from *Benevolence* must always produce an amiable Effect. A Man need not be much concerned about what appears *outwardly*, but take for granted that all would be right, if all was well *within*: For indeed 'tis this very thing which makes the Charm.

The Characters of *Fine Gentlemen* and *Ladies*, of the *Polite* and *Well-bred*, as they are called, are not unlike the Pieces of those Painters, who would rather please by *gaudy* and *glaring* Colours, suited to the Fancy and Genius of the Age, than express the *true Proportions* of Nature according

according to Art. But GOOD-BREEDING, or HONESTY itself, has always Rules ready to go by ; acting like the honest Painter or real Artist, according to Rules of Art independent of the World.

HONESTY every way extends itself thro' every Action *relating to Mankind* : Every *social* Action therefore ought to have something social in it, something friendly, kind, and benevolent. This makes it amiable and handsome, pleasant and agreeable ; agreeable in the *Prospect*, agreeable in the *Energy*, agreeable in the *Review* : I say every social Action, every Part of Behaviour to every one of the Species, whether great or small, considerable or inconsiderable. For if it be not *spirited with this Principle*, it will be some other, of a mean, contemptible, ridiculous, wrong, or unjust Kind ; from *foolish Fear*, a *mean* Endeavour to please, or *Concern* for pleasing : Some little or great Motive of Selfish-

ness of one kind or other. This in general must be the Case. But this can only be understood thoroughly by *particular Observation*.

Page 6. ELOQUENCE.] —

It was a Question among the *Romans*, whether *Eloquence* was the Effect of *Art*, or the natural Plant of *Exercise* in a good *Genius*? — *Tully's* Brother (as he says) was of this latter Opinion. But, if the Question be turned into this, Whether *Eloquence* is a thing which may be *learn'd*, or which I may make myself Master of by a right Use of my *Understanding*? there can be no room for Dispute. For, my *Understanding* discovering the Nature of *Exercise*, makes use of it to attain its End. And this, I suppose, is *Art*.

Exercise, commonly understood, is doing a thing over in *private*, in order

order to do it afterwards *better* in *public*: But, in general, 'tis the doing over, in order to do it *better* for the *future*: And in this Sense *Virtue* is an Exercise. For, as Conversation with *good Men* (as *Xenophon* expresses it) is Exercise of *Virtue*, so is likewise *Studying*, or living in private.

My Understanding tells me, I receive a double Advantage from *Exercise*: In the first place, it is that alone by which I acquire a *Habit*: And, in the next place, it presents to my Observation a new Scene of *Particulars*, for raising *general Ideas*; of which otherwise I could have no Notion at all.

Page 14. SCIENCE OF GENTLEMEN.]

“ This is the peculiar Science of the
 “ *Liberal*, or of *Gentlemen*. For this
 “ Science itself is alone for the sake
 “ of *itself*; and on this account it
 “ may be justly deemed to be no
 C 3 “ *human*

“ *human Possession.* For human Na-
 “ ture, in many Instances, is *de-*
 “ *pendent*: So that, according to
 “ *Simonides*, GOD alone can have
 “ this Privilege; and it is not
 “ fit for *Man* to enquire into any
 “ Science *above Man*. But, if there
 “ be any thing in what the *Poets*
 “ assert, and the DIVINITY be in-
 “ deed *envious*, it is likely it hap-
 “ pens in *this* respect; and that your
 “ *Virtuosos* are the most *miserable*
 “ of all Men. But it is not possible
 “ for the DIVINITY to be *envious*;
 “ and *Poets*, according to the Pro-
 “ verb, *in many things feign*. Nei-
 “ ther ought any other to be esteem’d
 “ as *more honourable*; because it is
 “ *most divine*, and *most honourable*.
 “ Now *this only* can be such in two
 “ Respects; for that which GOD
 “ has, is, of all Sciences, the *most*
 “ *divine*; and is, if any Science
 “ be so, of *Things divine*. Now
 “ this alone includes *both*: For GOD
 “ seems

“ seems to be the *Cause* in all things,
 “ and a *certain Principle*. And such
 “ a Principle, GOD, either *alone*, or
 “ *chiefly*, can possess. All other
 “ Sciences are more *necessary*, but
 “ none more *excellent*.” ARIST.
Met. p. 841. *Edit. Duval.*

Page. 20. TRANSLATION OF THE
 CONCLUDING PART TO THE SIXTH
 BOOK OF PLATO'S REPUBLIC.

Socrates. Know then, they are,
 as we are talking of them, *two*
 (*Mind*, and the Sun); and exercise
 Dominion; the one over the *intelli-*
gible Things in the *intelligible World*;
 the other over *visible Things* in the
visible World. Of these two Orders
 of Being, *Intelligible* and *Visible*, I
 suppose you have a clear Notion.

Glauco. I have.

Socrates. Carry on then this Di-
 vision, as if it were a Line divided

into two unequal Segments; and each of these, I mean the *sensible* and *intelligible*, divided again after the same manner; and you will have Evidence and Obscurity in your Ideas of them set one against another. In the *visible* kind, one Segment is *Images*: Under *Images* I comprehend, first, *Shadows*; and then those Imitations or Resemblances of things which appear in *Water*, and in things that are at the same time dense, smooth, lucid, and whatever there is of this kind, if you apprehend me?

Glauco. I apprehend you.

Socrates. For the other Segment, then, take that which this *first* is like, the living Creatures about us, and whatever is the Work of Nature and Art.

Glauco. I take it.

Socrates. Will you then allow of this Distinction between the Objects of *Opinion* and those of *Knowledge*,
that,

that, as they partake more and less of *Truth* and *Reality*, they are to one another as *Copies* to their *Originals* ?

Glauco. I will very readily.

Socrates. Now then consider the other Segment of the *Intelligible*, how this is again to be divided.

Glauco. How ?

Socrates. Thus — *One* Segment the Soul is obliged to *seek*, by using as Images the Things just now divided, and proceeding upon the Bottom of Hypotheses, not *upwards*, towards that which is *first*, but *downwards*, towards that which is *last*. The *other*, without using any of *this* sort of Images, but only *Ideas themselves*, as she makes her Way thro' them, and taking her Steps by means of Hypothesis *upwards*, towards that which is *first*, and incapable of being made the Subject of any Hypothesis.

Glauco.

Glauco. What you say, I don't sufficiently understand.

Socrates. Once again then ; for, after what has been said, you will the more easily understand it. You know, that they who are conversant in Geometry, Arithmetic, &c. suppose even and odd Figures, the three Species of Angles, and other things akin to these, according to each Method of proceeding : Now, having made them *Hypotheses*, as sufficiently knowing them, they are not pleased to give any further Account of them, either to themselves or others, as being evident to every one : And then, from these Beginnings having gone through the rest, they end at last with full Assent of Mind, in that, whatsoever it be, they shall have set themselves about to consider.

Glauco. This I know.

Socrates. You know too, that they make use of *visible Forms*, and talk
and

and discourse about them, whilst their Mind is employ'd, not about *these*, but the Things they are *like*; the *Square itself*, the *Diameter itself*, for Example; not *this* which they delineate: And so in other things, which are resembled by Shadows and Images in Water, whilst their Enquiry is, to see that which can be no otherwise seen than by the *Mind*. — This then is that Order of *Intelligibles* I was speaking of, in search after which, the Soul was obliged to make use of *Hypotheses*; not going *upwards* to that which is *first*, as wanting Strength to make Excursions above *Hypotheses*, but using as Images *Things themselves*, which are represented by others of the Order below, and are consider'd and divided as *evident*, in Comparison of *them*.

Glauco. As I understand you, you are speaking of *Geometry*, and those kinds of Arts.

Socrates.

Socrates. Understand then the other Segment of the *Intelligible* I am speaking of, to be that which *pure Reason* reaches ; making *Hypotheses*, as she exerts herself at large in the Way of *Dialectic* ; not *Principles*, but in Reality *Hypotheses*, as it were *Steps* and *Scaffolds*, in order to ascend, even to that which is incapable of being made *Hypothesis*, to *One first Principle of all Things* ; and then, when she has reach'd it, to come down again, holding by *Ideas*, which themselves hold from the *first Principle*, through *Ideas*, without the Help of any *sensible* thing at all, and end at last in *Ideas*.

Glauco. I don't well understand you : It seems to be of a complex Nature, what you are speaking of. I suppose you would distinguish that Portion of *Being* and *Intelligible*, which belongs to the Science of *Dialectic*, as carrying a higher Degree of
Evidence

Evidence than that which belongs to the *Arts*, as they are call'd ; where *Hypotheses* are *Principles*, and the Masters of them are obliged to know things by the *Eye of the Mind*, and not by the *Senses* : And yet, because they don't carry up their Search to that which is *first*, but build upon *Hypotheses*, you seem to think they have not a *full Understanding* of Things, tho' in themselves *intelligible*, as having a *real Foundation* in that which is *First*. When you speak of seeing Things by the *Eye of the Mind*, you seem to have in View *Geometrical* Things, &c. but so as to give them the Place of a *Mean* between *Opinions* and *Intelligence*.

Socrates. You understand me exceedingly well. And again — With your *four Segments*, take these *four corresponding Affections of the Soul* arising from them : With the *highest*, *Intellection* ; with the *second*, *Knowledge* ; against the *third*, set *Opinion* ;
and

and against the *fourth*, *Imagination*:
And give them proportionable Order ; understanding them to partake of *Evidence*, just as you see the Things they are corresponding with partake of *Reality*.

It may be observed, that under *Dialectic*, in the Translation above, is comprehended *Algebra* ; which proceeds upon *Hypotheses* or self-evident Principles, &c. just as *Geometry* does,

Plato's Aim is to express himself in the most *general distant Way* he possibly can ; not to explain the Thing *fully* to his Reader, so as to save himself the Trouble of any After-Thought and Study, but the quite contrary : For, when *Socrates* says the other Person sufficiently understands him, the Meaning only is, that he understands him *in the gross* ; as when I understand the *Terms* of a *Question*, the *Truth* of which I am
very

very incapable of determining, so as to understand it in this other Sense.

The Language of *Plato* in this Passage is so very *general*, that I had not for a long time any tolerable satisfactory Notion of it, till I particularly consider'd the *first*, *last*, and Things *intermediate*, in the latter End of the *Seventh Book*.

Page 22. ARITHMETIC PECULIAR TO PHILOSOPHERS.] — According to *Plato*, PHILOSOPHY is conversant about *unequal Monads*, the brightest clearest Truths of *Arithmetic*; its Business being only to enumerate the *Sorts* of *Things*, and see how they *agree* and *disagree*; or, in other Words, how they are *same* and *different*: And the like Evidence it carries in every Step it takes *synthetically* or *analytically*; every *Subject* and *Predicate* being two *Monads*. — Mankind, destitute

destitute of the *purest Light of the Understanding*, this *Philosophical Arithmetic*, are represented by *Plato* as *chained down in a dark Cavern*: Having *no Criterion* by which *Truth* may be known, they are, as it were, necessitated to take all things by *Guess*.

May not this be judged, by comparing *Plato's* Idea of *TRUTH*, or *GOOD*, as he calls it, with the Opinion of those Philosophers, who make *TRUTH* to *discover itself*? —
"Clear Evidence (says *the *Chevalier Ramsay*, speaking in his own the Sentiments of the Moderns) "*is a Per-*
"ception; a Light that modifies and de-
"termines the Mind irresistibly. I do
"not yet examine if this Evidence
"cheats us. Supposing it did so, --
"we must submit to it. It is an
"invincible Power, that has a sove-
"reign Dominion over us; over the
"American and the European, the

* *Phil. Prin. of Nat. and Rev. Rel. B. I. P. 19, 20.*

“ *Asiatic* and the *African*, the *Hot-*
 “ *tentot* and the *Laplander*, the
 “ *Chinese* and the *Peruvian*. We
 “ cannot escape from its universal
 “ Empire, &c. — I do not pretend
 “ to give a *general Criterion* or *Cha-*
 “ *racteristic*, by which one may know
 “ *Truth infallibly*: This is impossible.
 “ It is *known only by itself*; as *Sun-*
 “ *shine* is distinguished from *Twilight*.
 “ It is so *simple*, so *evident*, and so
 “ *luminous*, that it can have no
 “ other Token, Proof, nor Badge,
 “ but *itself*.”

But, if *clear Evidence* be from
clear Ideas, may it not be asked,
What it is that gives *Light* to these
Ideas themselves, or *strikes out Light*
from amongst them? ---- Are there
 not in Arts and Sciences (if the Ex-
 pression may be allow'd) *Syllables*? --
Syllable, in general, signifies *Compre-*
hension, or *Connection*, or *Combination*.
 In *Grammar*, for instance, it signi-
 fies *fewer* or *more Letters*. ---- In
 D *Geometry*,

Geometry, the *Syllables* are some *original Species of Quantity*; as *Lines* and *Figures*: As, for Example, a *Triangle*; then a *right-angled Triangle* in a *Semicircle*, which makes a *greater Syllable*, whose *Elements* still are *Lines* and *Figures*, &c. ---- In the *Understanding*, the *Objects* of *MIND* are *Syllables*, and have their *proper Elements*, every way extending thro' all *Systems of Knowledge*. --- If these *Elements* or *Principles* are *unknown* to the *European*, is he not in the *same Darknefs* (*Plato's Cavern*) with the *Hottentot* and the *Laplander*, the *Chinese* and the *Peruvian*?

“ *TRUTH* (it is said above) is
 “ known only *by itself*; as *Sunshine*
 “ is distinguished from *Twilight*; and
 “ is so *simple*, so *evident*, and so
 “ *luminous*, that it can have no
 “ other *Token*, *Proof*, nor *Badge*,
 “ but *itself*.” ---- Is not this in *Philosophy* like the *Quakers Light* in *Religion*?

Page 32. DIFFERENT OBJECTS OF REASON.]—There is this essential Difference between *Art* and *Science*. In the Way of *Science* you do not want the Assistance of *Memory* to form a *general Idea*, as you do in the Way of *Art*.--There is no need of *Memory* to understand the *general Definitions* or *Propositions* of *Euclid*; as there is, for instance, to know that *Tar-water* is *good*. --- Here you must try *Tar-water* in a Multitude of like Cases, and accurately remember the Effect of *each Trial*, in order to see the same in *every one*.

Page 36. SPECULATION.]-----To make the *biggest abstract Speculations pleasant* and *easy*, is the *main Point*. And to make the Speculation of *lower Subjects* likewise *easy* and *pleasant*, as join'd with the other, is ALL IN ALL. --- Now this is done, by applying *Aversion* to whatever in-

terferes with it. Let the Subject be whatever it will, it is not *itself* offensive to the Understanding. --- If then I am to consider the Subject of any abstract Speculation, I am not to put my Mind under *Constraint* : And, to make it *free*, I have only to *remove other intruding Thoughts*, and the Mind will naturally move upon the Subject which I place before it, and will do it with as much Ease, as when it accompanies the Eyes in the Survey of a Prospect.

Page 36. CONTEMPLATION. ----
Is Contemplation *Reasoning from Principles to Conclusions*; or having in View that which is *above Principles*, the SOVEREIGN BEAUTY, as related to the *sensible World*, and to *Man* in his *most improved State*? What is the νοεῖν of *Aristotle*, and the νῶν ἔχειν of *Plato*?

Page

Page 44. OUTWARD THINGS INDIFFERENT.] — Reason tells me there is no *Good* or *Evil* in *outward Things*; and, consequently, nothing *so* but what is in *my own Power*.

This is a Doctrine which is immediately dictated by the CAUSE OF ALL THINGS, which says to me in the Language of *Reason*, "That she keeps the Management of *outward Things* in *her own Hands*; and sets them a-going in *one unchangeable Order*: That she leaves me nothing to do, but what she has left in *my own Power*; equally free from all Concern for the *Past* and *Future*; neither of which are to be regarded, but as the Consideration of them may be useful *to myself, within myself*."

The Consideration of the *Past* is useful in two Respects; as it is to be *connected* with the *Future*, and as it may afford some Light for the

Management of the *Future*. And the *Future* is to be consider'd, that Things *within myself*, and what depends on them in *outward Behaviour*, may proceed in a regular orderly Manner, according to *Reason* and *Design*.

Without these, Life has nothing in it satisfactory; but, on the contrary, is dull, irksome, melancholy; affording no Pleasure in going *rationally* on, none in the *Prospect* of doing so, nothing in the kind in what is *past*, for Reflection.

Let a Life full of *Fears*, *Troubles*, and *mean Hopes*, be plac'd in Opposition, by way of *Contrast*, as 'tis call'd, to a Life of *Reason* and *Philosophy*, supposing both to be equally *private* and *unseen*: -- What signifies this? — Who would not willingly not only *weed out* all those *noisome poisonous Weeds*, but replenish his Mind with the *finest Flowers*? Who would not rather chuse to live
in

in a *beautiful Apartment*, everywhere surrounded with a *delightful Prospect*, than in a *poor loathsome Cot*, without a Prospect any way, but what is *odious* and *detestable*; and where your only Resource is, *not to know where you are?*

Page 45. TRANSLATION OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE SOUL IN THE TIMÆUS.] -----

“ By the Mixture
“ of that *Being* which is *invariable*,
“ and *always the same*, with that
“ which is *variable*, according to
“ the Nature of *Bodies*, he produced
“ a *third Mean* between them both.

“ And as to the Nature of *Same*
“ and *Different*, he constituted it in
“ like manner, a *Mean* between that
“ which is *invariable*, and that
“ which is *variable*, according to
“ the Nature of *Bodies*. And now
“ there are *Three*, he takes and
“ mixes them all in *One Idea*.”

Page 46. MEN OF SCIENCE.]---
 Modern Mathematicians do but *dream* about TRUTH. The *Objects* of their *Understandings* are they know not *what*. They know not whether they are *made*, or *not* ; whether they are *Phantoms*, or *Realities*. -- Modern Metaphysicians allow them *no Reality*; but suppose they are made as the *Soul* is, out of *nothing* ; and that the Existence of *external* Things is necessary to their *Truth*.

This seems to be Mr. *Locke's* Opinion. Does he not suppose the Understandings of Men to *come* and *go*, like the *Fruits* of *Trees* ? — And even with regard to HAPPINESS and GOOD, your *Men of Learning*, in common with the rest of Mankind, seem to have nothing in their Heads but *sensible Objects*, or *Imaginations form'd out of them* : Whilst the *Philosopher* has his own *Δαίμων* connected

nected with the UNIVERSAL ONE,
present every where, always in View.

This Δαίμων is *Plato's* κυριώτατον
ψυχῆς εἶδος, that FIXED INVARIABLE
PRINCIPLE, which, amongst all the
Changes and Revolutions of the *Af-*
fections, keeps us the *same within.*

Plato calls it ταυτόν, from its *fixed*
and *invariable Nature*; as he does
the other *inferior Part* ἕτερον.

The *close Connexion* between these
Two, and the *Power* of one over the
other, shews us plainly the *Beauty*
and *Order* of *Nature*. For, by the
Union and *Harmony* of these Two
different and *opposite Principles*,
MORAL BEAUTY ITSELF is form'd.
Could they *both be fixed*, or the latter
brought into a *regular Course* of *Con-*
formity with the *former*, by any one
Scheme or Resolution, *without Thought*
or Care in the Execution of it, VIRTUE
WOULD NOT BE VIRTUE. Such, how-
ever, is the *vulgar Thought* and *Ex-*
pectation.

Page 46. OPINION OF THINGS.]--
Right Opinion of Things gives *Tran-*
quility of Mind. By enumerating
 the Things that can give me *Dis-*
turbance, and applying the *general*
Opinion to every one of these Things,
 I find it true, that *Right Opinion* has
 this Effect. --- This is my Case *To-*
day : -- *To-morrow*, the *other* Opinion
 of Things creeps into the Mind, and
 works much Disturbance there, with-
 out my taking any Notice at all of
 what is doing ; and I am in the *dark*
 to *myself*, and *dream*, till I *awake*,
 and reflect on what has been doing
within. Then I apply *Right Opinion*,
 and all is *well* again.

Having repeated this many times,
 I find *Right Opinion* to be *Good*, and
 love it as such ; and *Vulgar Opinion*
 to be *Evil*. The oftener this is done,
 the more I esteem and value *Right*
Opinion, as *Good* ; and the more
 I disesteem and abhor *Vulgar Opinion*,
 as

as *Evil*: And the more I again esteem and value *my own Reason*, as it makes use of *Right Opinion*, and that *Original Reason* from whence my own is derived.

Hence the Necessity of setting *Right Opinion* in the *strongest Light*, and of keeping it alive in the *Mind*. This must be effected by *recovering* and *reviewing* the *Evidence*; by keeping the *Mind* in a proper Disposition, and, consequently, the *Body*; on the regular Motions of which depend the Motions of the *Mind*.

Right Opinion is good for nothing, without the *Use* of it: And the *Use* of it is from REASON, *as it governs*: Which, in this respect, tho' never taken notice of as such by the World, is the HIGHEST GOOD.

What is the GOVERNING PART?—
The *Governing Part* gives *Laws* (for instance, the *Laws of Temperance, Fortitude, &c.*); *directs* and *inspects* what is done with regard to these
Laws,

Laws, or learns what *new* Laws are wanting; and therefore *reviews*, as well as *looks forward*, and repeats this Work to the End of Life; but, above all, is *jealous* of its own *Authority*, and cautious against any *Insurrection* against it: For the main Struggle must be to *support the Government*.

Whatever Things have *Order*, have *Unity of Design*, and concur in *One*, are *Parts* constituent of *One Whole*. — SELF-GOVERNMENT must form and preserve *this* in Life. And no Wonder, as all the *Satisfaction of Life* depends upon it; and *immediate Uneasiness*, *Ill-humour*, and *Dissatisfaction*, attend the *Want* of it (as is abundantly evident from Experience); no Wonder, I say, so much Stress is laid upon it, as to place *HAPPINESS* and *Good* in it. *Love* and *Friendship* to *Some*, *Candor* and *Civility* to *All*, depend upon it, as its *Effects*. *These*, therefore,

fore, are Goods of a *subordinate* Kind, dependent on the former.

There is a manifest Difference in the *inward Features* of Men. This appears from the Consideration of the Characters of many *particular* Persons ; that is to say, their *general* Character, as they differ from one another. But the Character of *each* of them, as they live from *Day* to *Day*, is not consider'd. But this MORAL BEAUTY, which is to be pursued for its *own sake*, lies in the *Consistency* and *Harmony* of the *successive Actions* from one Day to another. And this is the End and Aim of a *good* and *virtuous Man*, as contain'd in his Prospect of *To-morrow*.

Let the Business then of *Self-Government* proceed according to *Art*. A *few general Laws* or *Rules* will not answer the End. It is not sufficient to *review*, *inspect*, and *direct* ; there must be *set Laws*, established as in a State ; and the Review,

view, Inspection, and Direction, be referred to the *Observance* or *Non-observance* of these *Laws*; and *general Consultations* held for making *new Laws*, or *Amendments* to *old ones*.

Probably the best Way to learn this Art of *Government* is by *Practice*; and to begin with the *least Things*. Think nothing too *inconsiderable* to be *recognized*. Begin, for instance, with Attention to every little thing that occurs in *Solitude*, or in the Company of the *meanest Persons*; with *Servants*; with my *Family*. For here is *Right* and *Wrong* in Things which are overlook'd, as indifferent, and not worth Notice.

This continual Attention to the *inward Concern*, is not more continual, constant, and minute, than that of the *Well-bred* towards their *outward Behaviour*. The Principle of this *latter Proceeding* is, partly, because

cause it is *right* and *handsome in itself*, and partly, because its handsome and amiable Appearance gains *Honour and Respect from abroad*. — The Principle of the *former* is a Sense, Opinion, or Belief, that it is *Good in itself*, and the *only Means* of passing away Life with *most Satisfaction*, and *least Uneasiness*, as well in *private*, apart from the World, as *abroad*, in the World. --- Now, as a Man must be *most unhappy*, who takes with him a *Deceiver*, that sticks to him, and follows him everywhere; so, on the other hand, is he *happiest*, when he takes with him a *true Friend*, who will never *deceive* him, but is constantly guarding him against *Imposture* and *Deceit*. Such a domestic Friend or Companion is surely nearer and dearer to him, than *Father, Mother, Children, Friends, Acquaintance, Patron, or Physician*.

This

This Regimen is in general directed by a due Regard to the Order of Things *within* and *without*; REASON *within*, *that* from *above*; the ORDER OF THINGS *without*, conducted by the *same Cause*.

Page 47. CUSTOM and FASHION.] How comes it to pass, that *Custom* and *Fashion* have so much Influence over human Affairs, as in a manner to *govern the World*? — May not this be accounted for, from considering the *Nature* of the *human Mind*? Tho' *Custom* and *Fashion* go together, yet they are not the *same*: For, in *different Times*, and *different Places*, FASHION *varies*; but, in *all Times*, and *all Places*, CUSTOM is the *same*.

How does *Fashion* take its Rise?— Is it not from *some One Person in Authority*, who gradually grows into Esteem, for some *new Discovery*, or *Practice*? ---- This Person shall be *imitated* Ages after his *Name* is forgotten,

gotten, or little more than his *Name* remains.

Is it not strange, to see how that not only the *Manners*, but the very UNDERSTANDINGS of Men, are *moulded* and *fashioned* by *Authors* in *Repute*, and *Doctrines* in *Credit*! And that Mankind in general pay more Regard to CUSTOM and FASHION than to TRUTH and NATURE!

Page 50. TRUTH GENERAL.]--
 Let *A* stand for One individual *Triangle*, in the One individual particular Semicircle *S*. Let *B* stand for another, in the same Semicircle; *C* for another, &c. &c. and *P* for another. Suppose I knew *A* to be a *right-angled Triangle*, in some particular manner or other (as by measuring); and likewise *B*, and likewise *C*: From my knowing that these

E Three

Three particular Triangles in the Semicircle *S* are *right-angled*, or even from my knowing that Twenty, or Thirty, or Ten thousand more, are right-angled, I cannot from hence conclude, that *P* in the same Semicircle is a *right-angled* one. --- Nay, suppose I could measure an *endless Number* of Triangles in the same Semicircle *S*; I cannot, even by *this*, conclude *P* in the Semicircle to be a *right* one. --- But, if I could some way or other measure ALL the Triangles in the said Semicircle *S*, and were *assured* I had done it, I am then likewise *assured*, that I have, among the rest, measured *P*, and that *P*, therefore, is a *right-angled Triangle*.—So that it is not my Idea of *Many* nor of *Number*, nor of *Infinite*, that is my Standard here, without the Idea of a WHOLE.

Thus I understand the 47th of *Euclid*, when I understand, that
EVERY

EVERY *right-angled Triangle* has Sides in the *Proportion* there mention'd. And tho', when I am satisfying myself of the *Truth* of that Proposition, I have only in View the *simple Forms* of *right-angled Triangles*, without a Thought of their being any of them combin'd or connected with *other Forms*; yet, when I come afterwards to know that all the Triangles in the Semicircle *S* above-mention'd are right-angled, I see at once this *All* included in the ALL or EVERY of the 47th Proposition. And this I take to be *Plato's* ἐξωθεν περιεχομένης in the *Sophista*. And the Case would be the same, if I knew the like of *all* the Triangles of Two such particular Semicircles as that mention'd, or of *Three*, or of *any* Number; nay, of ALL Semicircles whatever. This *All*, I should see at once was included in that GREAT ALL of the 47th Proposition. --- And thus the

Mind seems to proceed in the most ordinary Cases. And thus, universally, NATURE, by one GENERAL VOICE, speaking one thing after another, does, in reality, tell me ALL, σημαίνει περὶ πάντων.

Page 60. INDUCTION. ———
 Nothing can be more instructive than what *Aristotle* says of the Method of acquiring Knowledge by Induction. If we join what he says of Prudence, or the Knowledge of Particulars, we have then from him One General Rule for finding out Truth in Moral Subjects; and are let into the Nature and Manner of studying ourselves; which, in short, is thus: -- By Inspecting the PRESENT, Looking back on the PAST, and Forecasting the FUTURE. — For this includes Prudence, which includes 'Ευβελία. ———
 Nay, the very Nature of this very thing

thing itself is learned by the same Method: By many particular *φρονήσεις*, I shall come to know PRUDENCE ITSELF; what it is to *me*, and whether it be *κράτιστον ἐπιτήδευμα*.

Ἐυβελία is a right State of Mind, in which we consider what is proper or useful to a certain End. — Suppose the End I would obtain to be *Eating plain Food with Pleasure, and without a Desire of what is called Good-Eating*; I thus consider with myself before-hand:

Every time I use Exercise and Abstinence, I *eat with Pleasure*, and my *Spirits are raised*:

To-day I use Exercise and Abstinence:

To-day I shall eat with *Pleasure*, &c.

It may be observed, that the End proposed by the *prudent Man*, in every Circumstance of Life, is *good*;

and the *Consideration of the Means*, by *syllogizing within himself*, must likewise (besides the Beauty of it, common to all other Reasoning) be *agreeable* ; and it must be *much more* so, to attain the *End*.

The Observation of *one* and the *same*, in particular *simple* Things, and syllogizing on this Bottom, makes the Harmony of *Mind* with *sensible* Things.—Hence, by the way, the *Beauty of the Soul's Mixture*, where MIND accompanies *Sense* everywhere. —Thus, the continual Union of *Sense* and *Reason*, in the Application of GENERAL IDEAS to the *Particulars of Life*, makes a *perfect Character*. That which determines the Agent to *such* a Conduct, is the *Good* he understands to be in it. A *thorough Idea* of this *Good* is collected from *Practice* ; and the *Practice itself* is supported and maintained by this *very Idea*, which is
lost

lost in every kind of it, as the Conduct turns another Way.

Page 65. HARMONY of NATURE, &c.] -- The Author here follows the Antients, in taking this double View of *Nature*, considering her as *passive*, and considering her as *active*. — — — Some of the Moderns seem to have no other Notion of God, than as an *Architect*; nor of the *World*, than as a *Building*: God has Materials (Atoms) and, these put together according to Art, a *World* is made. On this Hypothesis their Imagination naturally gives *Bounds* to their *World*; leaving to itself a vast Field of Space to range in beyond it, which they call *Infinite*; because they can always imagine a *Space* beyond what they at any time imagine. They make the *Bulk* of the Building, but not the

E 4 *Materials,*

Materials, to have Form, Beauty, or Order. Whereas, according to the *Antients*, there was no Part of *Nature*, either *within* or *without*, but what had the *Stamp* or *Impression* of *Divine Art*.

As to the *Power of imagining*, may not one presume to be upon an equal Footing with any of the *Moderns*? Let the World of the *Antients* therefore keep Pace, with their *imagin'd Space*; let it indeed be *bigger*, that it may be, to a PERFECT EYE, a FULL OBJECT; and for a PERFECT UNDERSTANDING to display itself upon, a FULL SUBJECT.

Page 68. COMMENSURATE to the UNDERSTANDING, &c.] — It may be objected, that *Finite* cannot comprehend that which is *Infinite*; and that nothing beside what is *infinite* can see *infinite Connexions*.

Infinite,

Infinite, being that which exceeds any *assignable Finite*, cannot be comprehended by it: But *Infinite*, in *this* Sense, evidently falls within the Comprehension of the human Mind. Every *general Idea* is of *larger Extent*: And were it not so, we could not *reason*; nor would there be any such thing as *Truth*. -- Every and *All* are implied in every *general Proposition*; but an *Infinity* of Things is only *Some* Things: And from an *Infinity* of *Triangles* having Angles equal to *Two right*, you cannot conclude that any *One* has.

As to seeing the infinite *Connexions* in the *Visible Universe*, no doubt there is need of an Eye to take in the *whole Object*; but there is no need of Ideas of larger Extent than the *human*, to judge of the *Whole*.

Suppose we had *Telescopes* that discover'd the Universe to be fill'd
 3 with

with *Solar Systems*, and Sir *Isaac Newton's* Theory of our System to be *true*, we should then see the *Whole* moving according to one and the same *general System of Laws*.

Page 70. PERICLES.] — If *Pericles* knew what MIND is, and that ART, or the *very Being* of ART *itself*, is dependent upon it, and from thence derived into the *human Mind*, was he not enabled by this means to proceed in the best and most *masterly Manner*, in order to attain *Perfection* in his *Art*? -- Would he not, without this Knowledge, have gone on in a manner *blindfold*?

Page 71. ORDER of THINGS.] — The *Order* of *all Things* is settled by the GOVERNOR of *all Things*. 'Tis
wrong

wrong therefore in me to break in upon *this Order*, by desiring it to be otherwise than it is in any Case whatever. This is not *submitting* to God; and, besides, it is making myself *miserable*.

But, in this *Order of Things*, there is something I ought to reverence, which I have myself a Share in; and this is *χρῆσις φαντασιῶν*. My *past Thoughts* and *Actions* are *necessary*. I could not do *otherwise*. Now they are *past*, I can *review* them; I can *correct* my *Thoughts*, and renew my *Attempt*; I can lay my *Design* *better*. — Here again there is *Error unavoidable*. However, I am still Master of myself: I can still renew my practical and speculative *Thoughts*. I can see again what is *amiss*, and endeavour to do *better*. And thus my *Business* is *To-day* as *Yesterday*, and *To-morrow* as *To-day*: Till, at last, *To-day* or *To-morrow* closes

closes the Scene, and puts an End to the *Action*; which is not *broken* or *interrupted*, but *finished* and *complete*, as it is *terminated according to Design*.

Page 72. MODERN MORALIST.]
The common Error of our *Modern Moralists* is trusting too much to *Will*. They who maintain that Men do ill KNOWINGLY (as they phrase it), have Reason to regard their *Will* more than their *Understanding*. Thus is all *Philosophy*, or the Use of *Reason* in *moral* Subjects, subverted at once.

The Earl of *Shaftesbury* has very artfully undermined this Prejudice, by his borrow'd Story of an Amour, in which the Vanity of trusting to a *Will* sufficiently appears; as well as the Importance of *reasoning with ourselves* upon the *Motives* of Action.

tion. For the more we lose our *Reason*, the *less Power* have we to do what we *please*; and the *stronger* any *Passion* grows in us, the *weaker* in proportion does our *Reason* grow. The Knowledge which the young Nobleman wanted, was that of the *Evil* of this *Passion* which made him a *Slave*. Had he known this, so as to prevent the Growth of his *Passion*, he had maintained his *Liberty*, and done nothing *amiss*. And thus, could we view ourselves with regard to the other *Passions*, which make *Avarice*, *Intemperance*, *Luxury*, *Pride*, *Ambition*, *Cowardice*, *Sloth*, so as to keep them within those Bounds which *Nature* has fixed, we should in no Case, with regard to ourselves, or Mankind, act *amiss*.

But how is this Growth of these *Passions* to be *prevented* or *opposed*?—
By applying that *natural Power*
which

which *Nature* has given us for this Purpose, AVERSION OF RESENTMENT. But, in applying this, we must take care to have Courage not to be in a *Passion*, or *disturbed*, if at the same time we cannot succeed in our *moral Attempts*; but remember always to say, “ * You are come, O *Fancy*, “ according to your old Custom, “ *angry* with you I am *not*; only “ *begone*.” For, otherwise, this *Passion*, which is *assistent* to Reason, would prove its *worst of Enemies*. — The *Nature* of Things cannot be alter’d.

Page 73. LOVE of TRUTH.] — It cannot be denied that there is naturally in all Men, not only in Matters of *Speculation*, but likewise of *Prælice*, a *Love of Truth*. For,

* Marc. Antonin.

in *Practice*, no one does amiss willingly, but for want of *knowing better*. To assert that a *Man* does amiss, *knowing better*, is to talk of *Knowlege without Knowlege*.

There can be no Knowlege (strictly speaking) but when the Mind is *quiet and calm*, undisturbed by Passions *within* itself, or by any irregular Motions of the *Body*. *Modern Mathematicians* and *Gamesters* observe the strictest *Temperance*, in order to make the best Use of their *Understandings*. The *Gamester* resembles the *Philosopher* in *one* respect better than the *Mathematician*; his Business being not bare *Theory*, but how to suit his *Practice* with his *Speculation*.

For the Reason before-mention'd, *Children*, or *sick Persons*, or *Persons in Liquor*, are said to be *incapable of Knowlege*. And he that reflects upon what he *has* done, and says that he *now* knows *better*, may be said to be

be in the Case with a Man in Liquor grown *sober*, or a *sick* Man that has recover'd his *Health*. So that, not only *that Knowledge* which falls under the Head of *Science*, but likewise that which falls under the Head of *Prudence*, depends upon a *Quiet* and *Calm within*.

Had this been the State of *Medea's* Mind, she could no more have *destroy'd* her *Children*, than she could have *removed* a *Mountain*. She was *drunk* with *Passion*; she was *mad*: But still she had the *Appearance* of *Reason*. Something was in her *Mind*, which was the Cause of this Disorder: For she thought it *right*, and could not *help* it. — This is allow'd. Let her now recover out of her *Sleep*, or *Dream*, or *Madness*; and now she finds her only Remedy in her *Reason*, and that *Knowledge* was the Thing she wanted; and that in *reality* she wanted it, and was therefore *mad*.

Every

Every one *does* that which *seems* good to him ; but *desires* and *wishes* only what is *good in itself*. So that, if he does not understand what is *good in itself*, he acts contrary to the *Wish* or *Desire* of his own *Mind*. When therefore we act *amiss*, 'tis thro' *Ignorance*, or rather *Madness* ; for 'tis then we are *beside ourselves*. And the ready Way to act right, is to *keep our Reason*, or *governing Part*) in its proper Station. Hence, VIRTUE is *Knowlege*, and PHILOSOPHY the *Love of Truth*. 'Tis nothing but freely exercising the Mind on the Subjects of *Religion* and *Morality*. ----- If in *Practice* any thing is *amiss*, 'tis for *Want* of *Knowlege* ; nor can it be otherwise rectified, than by supplying this *Want* : And the endeavouring to *do* better, is but endeavouring to *know* and *understand* better ; which proceeds from a *sincere Pursuit* and *Love of Truth*.

Page 77. *Μορδεϊς* of PLATO.] —
 'The *Mind* is like the *Eye*, which
 opens on a Prospect which had a
 Being *before*; supposing it to be so
 constituted, that the Sight of one
 Object in the Prospect depended on
 the Sight of another. Neither the
 OBJECTS, nor the LIGHT by which
 they are seen, are *generated*. When
 we discover *Truth*, 'tis with the
inward Eye as with the *outward* one,
 when it sees a new Object.

The Objects of the Eye are *fixed*
 to a Place: Those of the *inward*
Eye accompany it wherever it goes;
 and are either moveable from Place
 to Place, as *Bodies* are; or else, if
 they are fixed, they belong to a
Being, which, in all Places, is the
same *μωρδεϊς*,

Page 80. GOOD ORIGINAL.] —
 " What is it, which at one time
 " raises

“ raises *Virtue* so high, and at an-
 “ other reduces it to nothing?
 “ What Intervention, what Com-
 “ position of Ideas?” ——— The
 Answer to this Question will for
 ever give Ease. ——— From consider-
 ing, according to *Plato*, GOOD,
 ORIGINAL, that Order of Being
 which is most truly *real*, and of
 which whatever exists in *sensible*
 Things, is but a *Shadow*, *transitory*
 and *changeable*; while the other is
invariable, and *always the same*; and
always at hand too, if we think it
 worth enjoying.

Set this in Opposition to *Fancy*,
 or that which *pleases*; and rise from
 Particulars to this, which is *universal*,
 and comprehends all the other origi-
 nally, and where they have only any
real Existence. — *Fancy*, with its *Conse-*
quences. --- What the Consequences
 of *Fancy* towards this *higher Order of*
Beauty? --- To the Consideration of
 Things out of our Power, join this

other Consideration, *What Nature herself calls for, or really wants.* It may be observ'd, that *Desire disappointed*, produces a greater *Lowness of Spirits* than that which arises from *bodily Pain, hard Labour, Abstinence, or Study.*--The Desire towards Things out of our Power is the Cause of *Uneasiness*; and therefore is as much an *Evil*, and to be dreaded as such, as Pain, or Labour, or any thing else which we commonly shun as *evil*: I mean, there is a Foundation in the *thing itself* for *Aversion* towards it.

Outward Beauty, Grandeur, and Power, are *no* Objects of *Desire*, or but *poor* ones. There is something *within your own Power* more *real*, and more *perfect*, in the kind.

Page 81. BEAUTY.] ———

BEAUTY IN GENERAL is *Harmony* or *Proportion*, adjusted by *Mind* or *Reason*,

son, whether it exists in the Characters of Men, in sensible Things, whether of Art or Nature, in any Part of the Universe, or in the Whole: And MORAL BEAUTY is a Species under this Genus.

If I am disinterested, and give up all outward Things, what have I left that is *good* or *valuable*? — You have that left which all Mankind pursue and admire in one sort of Things or other; and that which is left to you is the *best* of all the Sorts. -- But you must resign even your *Being* for your *Friend*, for your *Country*, or for *Nature*. Be it so; in either Case the same Reason holds good; 'tis *just*, *handsome*, and *becoming*. I leave nothing behind me that is *good*, and have nothing to *fear*.

Virtue and Honesty, tho' here joined together as *One* Thing, should rather be consider'd as *Two*: *Virtue*, as including all those *Truths*, or *Rules*

of *Reason*, which regulate a Man's Character, with regard to *himself*, to *other Men*, and the *Order of Things*: And *Honesty*, taking in only those which regulate the Conduct of Man with relation to *other Men*.

To lay down our Life for one's *Friend*, or *Country*, or freely resign it to *Nature*, surely belongs rather to *Virtue* than to *Honesty*: As a Man, for not being a Volunteer in these Cases, can never be called *knaveish*, or *dishonest*. --- *Virtue*, in this large Sense, as it implies *Beauty*, *Order*, *Symmetry*, *Consistency*, &c. is an Idea which we may take from the Course of Life of *Socrates*, *Plato*, &c. in their several Circumstances and Situations in the World, and understand by *Virtue* that which is common to them all.

This is VIRTUE ITSELF, or that Species of the *ἁγία*, or τὸ ὄν of the Antients, which they express'd by 'ΑΥΤὴ ἡ Δικαιοσύνη, 'ΑΥΤὴ ἡ Ἀρετὴ, which has
nothing

nothing to do with *sensible* Things, and exists only in *Mind*; as a *Triangle*, or the *Triangle itself*, is that which is common to all *sensible* and *particular* Triangles; and has none but a *mental*, that is, the most *real Existence* in the World. --- As to the *Ideas* of *Virtue itself*, and a *Triangle itself*, when it is consider'd how these Two Ideas come into the Mind, how difficult the *former*, and how easily the *latter*, the Reason of the conceal'd Manner of the Antients will appear in a new and true Light.

Page 84. IDEA of VIRTUE.] — Tho' we ought often to exert ourselves directly in the Speculation of *Virtue*, so as to comprehend and contemplate it, as it stands in a *perfect Character*; yet, if we directly aim at such Perfection, and are bent upon raising our Character immediately to this high Standard,

whilst we are thus pursuing *Wisdom* and *Happiness*, we make ourselves not only *ridiculous*, but very *unhappy*: We shall labour under a Burden too heavy for us to bear. And yet, perhaps, without some Attempts of this kind, we should hardly know

Quid valeant humeri, quid ferre recusent.

On the contrary, if we proceed the other Way, by applying our AVERSION to what is wrong in the *Affections*, we may be more easy within ourselves, and more successfully attain our End. And, indeed, what is more beautiful and amiable, than this *simple* and *modest* Disposition of Mind itself, in which we are contented and satisfied with what is in our Power of *Virtue* and *Knowledge*, as well as of *outward* Things?

Page 85. HARMONY WITH NATURE.] — *To harmonize with Nature*, is to leave the Order of Things *without* to her Management. And this is but *just*. -- This Order is *fixed* and *uncontroulable*. We *have* nothing to do with it, because we *can* do nothing with it: And as *Nature* in this respect *will* have her Way, so 'tis *best* she *should*. — This is her *first* Care, that we *meddle not* with *those Affairs of her's*, in which we are not concerned. -- Her next is this, to employ her whole Force in *those Things*, in which SHE is concerned, and WE too; but we much more; I mean, *those Things* which she has placed within ourselves; -- in the Management of *these Affairs* to ASSIST and REWARD our Endeavours. The latter she will do, by bestowing *Health*, and *outward Success*, so far as she can *consistently* with her outward Establishment; and with Peace, Quiet,

Quiet, Tranquility, Freedom, Temperance, Fortitude, Justice; with Faith, Candor, Civility, to all Men; with Love and Friendship to others, with whom we are more nearly concerned. The *former* she will do, by imparting that *Knowledge* (so fast as we labour for it) on which the before-mention'd good things depend. She forgives all that is past: But, as it is in your Power to *look back* on the *past*, and as such Reflection may be of the greatest Use to you for the *future*, this she expects of you, and nothing more, with regard to the *past*. And what relates to the *future*, her Commands are still the same, to confine your whole Force to what is in *your own Power*, having nothing to do with *her Management*.

Page 86. TRUTH.]—Besides TEMPERANCE, LIBERTY, and HONESTY, TRUTH likewise is necessary
in

in a *virtuous Character*. Without TRUTH, the former are I know not what: *Honesty* is absolutely dependent on *Liberty*; and *Liberty*, without *Honesty*, is a maim'd, broken, half-form'd Thing.

By LIBERTY, I understand Freedom from those Passions which are raised from the *View* or *Impression* of *outward Things*; or from an Opinion of *Good* and *Evil* in them. By *outward Things*, are understood the *Course of Nature*, as our Life and Being depends upon it; the *Conduct* of *Men*, with their *Characters*, and the *Works* of *Art*; and the *Possessions* of the *Great*. --- What is good or evil *here*, is to be settled by those Truths which shew Man as he is in his *natural State*, and what his *natural Wants* are. -- In all this, Man is consider'd as he is in *himself*.

HONESTY relates to *Mankind*. There is something *social* in it: As in every Action relating to Mankind
there

there *must* be something *social*; and the several Species of these *social Actions* must be determined by every one according to his Circumstances, as Particulars fall in his Way; some comprehended under one Species, some under another.

TRUTH. -- There are proper *Reasons* (natural to the respective Subjects) on which *Liberty* and *Honesty* depend: But these are not sufficient to complete the *virtuous Character*. The Evidence, Nature, and Certainty of *these Reasons* must be determined, and the *Theory* of the *Understanding* made *complete*, in order to finish *Independency*, and take off *Admiration* from what is commonly esteem'd as *excellent* in the *shining Characters* of the World.

A right Behaviour to Mankind, but more particularly with regard to the *Reverence*, *Respect*, *Esteem*, and *Admiration* of them, depends in every Instance on the *Knowledge*
of

of Mankind. -- To be *always* looking
 into *one's-self*, seeing one's own *Faults*,
 without looking *abroad*, is the sure
 Way of thinking *too meanly* of *one's*
self, and *too highly* of *other Men*. —
 What is there in our *learned Moderns*
 to be admired? -- What Knowledge
 have they of *human Nature*? ---
 What of *God*? -- What *secret Ways*
 have they of acquiring Knowledge and
Ability? -- What Skill in the Ways
 of *Induction*, *Synthesis*, and *Analysis*?
 But some of them, it seems, are
 admired for being *Masters of Lan-*
guage, and the *ready Use* of it! --
 Be it so: -- Is not this Ability *soon at-*
tained? -- *Truth* lies much deeper than
Words. What is there in the *Polite*,
 or the *Men of Breeding*, to be
 admir'd? -- What in those distin-
 guished by *Fortunes* and *Titles*? ---
 What in some of a *graver Character*?
 What are their *real inward Features*,
 compar'd with their *outward Airs*
 of Wisdom, Learning, Importance,
 &c.

&c. -- Is there not some *Standard*, by which the several Characters above-mention'd may be judged; and by which it may be discover'd how they themselves, with all their Admirers, *wander in Darknefs*?

Page 88. KNOWLEDGE of OURSELVES.] — *Philosophy*, as it teaches us the *Knowledge of ourselves*, seems at first Sight to be no *deep Study*. In the Writings of *Xenophon*, the Earl of *Shaftesbury*, and particularly of *Arrian*, it carries the Appearance of a Work rather of *Common-Sense* than *accurate Reasoning*. But this is only *Appearance*: It is in reality the *deepest of all Studies*, and requires the *clearest Head*, and most *accurate Understanding*: And this not only in the *higher Subjects*, but the *lower ones*; not only as we stand related to God, the *Chief Beauty*, and *Sovereign Good*, but in what relates to
ourselves,

ourselves, as *moral Agents, and social Creatures.*

Together with what is most sublime in *Speculation*, it contains not only what is common to the *Sciences* of the *Learned*, but what is common to *all Arts*; and in both respects is *truly excellent.*

Page 92. DEFINITION ACCORDING TO PLATO.] ---- *Plato's* full Meaning in this Place of the *Sophista*, cannot be taken from Examples of *geometrical Demonstrations*; and, for that Reason, he makes use of *other* Examples. --- Every λόγος, according to *Aristotle*, in his first Book of the *Soul* (where he seems to *oppose Timæus*, but, in reality, *explains* him) is either ὁρισμὸς, or ἀπόδειξις: And it is of the former, I think, *Plato* gives us Examples.

Let *A* stand for such a *Genus*, as, ἀσπαλιεύτης: *B*, for such a *Genus*, as *Artist*; *C, D, E, F, G, H, &c.*

for the several Subdivisions of *B*:
Then, as I take it, *Plato's* Proceed-
ing is in reality thus :

Every *A* is *B*; every *B* is either
C or *D*; therefore every *A* is either
C or *D*. And now, it appearing
at Sight, that no *A* is *C*, the Con-
clusion is in reality this, Every
A is *D*. -- And now he proceeds
again; Every *A* is *D*; every *D* is ei-
ther *E* or *F*; therefore every *A* is
either *E* or *F*. And here, again,
it appearing at Sight, that no *A* is
E, the Conclusion is, Every *A* is *F*.
Again -- Every *A* is *F*; every *F* is
either *G*, or *H*; therefore every *A*
is *G*, or *H*. And here, again, it
appearing, that no *A* is *G*, the Con-
clusion is, Every *A* is *H*. -- And
thus he proceeds, till he comes to
that which distinguishes *A* from all
other things. -- Let *H* (for Example)
be the particular Mark by which *A*
is thus distinguished: Then this is
the most complete λόγος of *A*; viz. *A* is
H,

H, and *F*, and *D*, and *B*; collecting all the former Conclusions into one Proposition.

Page 101. ΤΟ ΔΙΑ ΤΙ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ.]
That is *first*, on which the rest hang.
That is *first*, and the Principle of
Science, which if you take away,
there is no Science, Knowledge, Reason,
Opinion, or Understanding;
and which if you grant, all the rest
follow.

Science is of *Universals*, and
Things *immutable* and *eternal*: That
therefore which is *prior* to it, must
be *immutable* and *eternal*; and every
Universal is *One* common to *Many*:
If *Many* is *not*, there is *no Universal*;
and if *Being*, *Same* and *Different*,
are *not*, *Many* is *not*; every *One* of
which *Many* consists, *is*, or has
Being belonging to it; and *Being*
is the *same* in every *One* of these
G *Many*:

Many: And if these *Ones* are not each *different* from another, they are not *Many*, but *One* and the *same* individual Thing. -- *Difference* therefore is *prior* to *Many*, as well as *Being* and *Same*. And these are *universally* in every other *Universal*, and are to *Universals*, as *Universals* are to *Particulars*.

Page 106. PHILOSOPHY MODERN AND ANTIENT.] ——— There have been some Persons who imagin'd they could understand Sir *Isaac Newton's* Philosophy, without any previous Acquaintance with the *Mathematics*. But this Absurdity is apparent and obvious. -- There is another Absurdity of the like kind, tho' not so apparent and obvious, which Men are apt to fall into, with regard to the *Speculations* of the *Antients*. For there are *certain Truths*, acquir'd by

by a long Exercise of *Reason*, both in *particular*, and likewise in those Subjects that are most *general*, as much, perhaps, out of the Reach of the *greatest Mathematician*, as *his* Speculations are above the Capacity of some that are now called *Mathematicians*.

This is unobserved by the *Learned*: And they imagine, that, had the *Antients* spoken out their Minds plainly, they should fully have *understood* them. There are *few, very few* Men, who think, that, by *another's* Understanding, *they themselves* may not understand. But Mankind are not to be made any more truly *knowing* than *happy*, by *another's* Understanding. --- There is no Man can *at once* convey Light in the higher Subjects to another Man's Understanding. It must come into the Mind from its own Motions *within itself*: And the grand Art

of *Philosophy* is, to set the *Mind* a-going; and, even when we think nothing of it, to assist it in its *Labour*. And, with regard to *φρονήσις*, as well as *ῥῆσις*, the Antients never attempt to lead you into *Knowledge* by a continued Chain of Reasoning: On the contrary, they write in such a Manner, as to force you to think for yourself.

Page III. MIND EVERY-WHERE.] Let *Socrates* be still living, with the same *Knowledge*, or *Stock* of general *Ideas*: Let him have his *Mansion*, not in the *Elysian Fields*, but in some *Star*: Let him have *Eyes* and *Ears* to see and bear what passes on this *Earth*; and let him have no other general *Knowledge* but what he had before; but let him have the particular *Ideas* of *you*, and *me*, and every other *Individual*. Now, as he will be able to

to judge of *my* Character and *yours*, so he will of *every other individual Person*. ---- Thus *Socrates*, by the *same Mind* he had *formerly*, will be able to *understand* and *judge* of all the Characters of Men on this *Earth*. If there be *other Men* in the rest of the *Planets*, he will know all their Characters by the *same general Ideas* he made use of to judge the Men on *Earth*. And, in like manner, if the whole Universe be stock'd with such Creatures as *we* are, by the *same general Ideas* he will likewise judge of *them*, and *know* what they are. --- 'Tis evident, his *general Ideas* will accompany his *particular* ones to the *remotest Sphere*; and he will be able to know what passes *there*, as well as *you* and *I*, by the *same general Ideas*, know what passes where we are at *present*.--So far *Socrates* will be *everywhere*: And thus, by only adding the Perception of *Particulars* to such
general

general Ideas as we have, the Idea of a God may be form'd. --- Thus, *Socrates* has it in his Power to be *every-where*, or, in learned Language, is, *δυσάμει*, *every-where*, by turning his View successively towards any Object in the Universe, as he pleases ; but God is *ἅμα πανταχῶ*.

If it be thought strange and wonderful, that *Socrates* should have such *infinite Sense* of *Hearing and Seeing*, I think it much more strange and wonderful, that, by the Help of a *few general Ideas*, compar'd with that *infinite Number* of *Particulars*, which he observes in the particular Characters of Men throughout the Universe, he should be able to judge and know such an INFINITY of CHARACTERS.

Nor have I, methinks, done *Socrates* so great an *Honour*, nor would *be* think it so great a *Happiness*, were he really in the high Station I have placed

placed him. His own *Understanding*, serving his own particular *Person*, and all that belong'd to it, gave him more *Worth* and *Happiness*, than when employ'd in surveying an *Infinity* of *Particulars*. Here lay his *Excellency*; for, take away his UNDERSTANDING, and, with his *infinite Sense*, he becomes a VERY BRUTE.

This Perception of Particulars in GOD, *Xenophon* expresses by the Word ὀφθαλμός, as he does these *general Ideas* by φρόνησις, in the Dialogue of *Socrates* with *Aristodemus*.

The *Pythagoreans* diffuse the *Soul* throughout the Universe *every-where*, and bring it out from the Center *every-where*, and with it surround the Universe.—By this, as I take it, they rather signify what *Xenophon* means by ὀφθαλμός, than what he means by νῆς, or φρόνησις. In the old *Timæus*, indeed, there is no mention made of this Distinction: But *Plato* seems to have

have made it; for he places *νῆς* in the *outer Sphere*, furrounding the rest; and gives it a Communication with all that is *within*, by which it understands all that passes. He takes care to unite *νῆς* with ὀφθαλμός.

The Truth is this; the *Pythagoreans* seem to express the Perception both of *Sense* and *Mind*, by diffusing the Soul *every-where* throughout the Universe. But *Plato* has taken care to distinguish *Sense* from *Mind*; and, at the same time, to make them *accompany one another every-where*. In the *outer Sphere* he has placed MIND (which is always the SAME, and INVARIABLE), and given it a Communication with the *variable* Parts of the *Universe*.

Page 135. ONE IDEA THROUGH ALL MANYS, &c.] — There is a beautiful Opposition in the Expression which strikes a Light upon the Whole.

By

By *One Idea* through all *Manys* wrapt up in *One* (thro' every general *Idea* of every *Syllogism* in every *Art* and *Science*) no more is meant than what I call a *Monad*, consisting of *Being*, *same* and *different*. -- And it is proper to say they are wrapt up in *One*, as every *One* of *Many* in general consists of these *Ideas*.

Page 144. GOD ONE.] ———
 The Reason given by *Spinoza* that God is *improperly* called *One*, is, that *One* is a *relative* Thing; and that we call a thing *One* with regard to its *Existence*, and not with regard to its *Essence*. -- But why has not *One* and *Many*, and every *One* of every *Many*, *Essence*, as well as other Things?

In Truth, GOD is ONE ITSELF;
 and is most *justly* and *properly* defin'd
 by

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by *One*, as He is the *Essence* of every *Many*; and, consequently, of all the *infinite Combinations* and *Harmonies* resulting from them.

F I N I S.



